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Abstract: The main problem for health professionals and patients in accessing information is that this information is very often 
distributed over many medical records and locations. This problem is particularly acute in cancerology because patients may be treated 
for many years and undergo a variety of examinations. Recent advances in technology make it feasible to gain access to medical records 
anywhere and anytime, allowing the physician or the patient to gather information from an “ephemeral electronic patient record”. 
However, this easy access to data is accompanied by the requirement for improved security (confidentiality, traceability, integrity, ...) 
and this issue needs to be addressed. In this paper we propose and discuss a decentralised approach based on recent advances in 
information sharing and protection: Grid technologies and watermarking methodologies. The potential impact of these technologies for 
oncology is illustrated by the examples of two experimental cases: a cancer surveillance network and a radiotherapy treatment plan. It 
is expected that the proposed approach will constitute the basis of a future secure “google-like” access to medical records.
Keywords: data security, electronic signature, direct access, medical record, patient identifier, watermarking, grid
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1. Introduction
Throughout Europe, patients are entitled to have 
direct access to their medical records. For example, 
in France, this has been true since 2002; previously, 
only indirect access via a physician was allowed. 
At present, the simplest solution consists in giving 
to the patient a paper copy of his/her medical record 
or, if it has been computerized and if the function 
is available, a digital copy on a readable storage 
medium. This communication process can be carried 
out “without constraint at reasonable intervals and 
without excessive delay or expense” as required 
by article 12 of the Directive “On the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data”.1 Such 
a delay is needed, however, to ensure that the identity 
of the individual making the request can be properly 
checked and that any additional conditions on access, 
such as those provided for in article 13 section 1(g) 
of the same directive1 “for the protection of the Data 
Subject or the rights and freedoms of others”, are 
correctly fulfilled. This current approach does not 
involve any particular risk to the information system, 
but there are already pressing demands from patients 
with their increasingly powerful computing facilities 
to speed up these processes and to have direct 
access to medical record systems. These pressures 
will be difficult to resist in the present, fast moving, 
electronic environment, and it is difficult to imagine 
that the traditional, delayed, process will be accepted 
for much longer. Soon, patients will be expecting 
to have direct access to their medical files via the 
internet or its equivalent. Instead of trying to resist 
this inescapable evolution, it is preferable to seek 
solutions that provide security for both patients and 
health professionals while allowing this valuable 
development in the area of personal freedom and 
human rights.
However, one on the main problems of direct 
access is that patient’s medical records, especially in 
oncology (as several health practitioners of different 
specialties have to participate in patient care), may 
be split into different parts and recorded in the 
information system of different healthcare centres. 
It is not reasonable to expect patients suffering from 
cancer to deal with the dispersion of their medical 
information themselves; they should be provided with 
a secure way to consult it.
For more than 20 years, Research and Development 
teams have been working on standardised, centralised, 
secure and reliable Medical Record (MR) systems. 
The French DMP project to implement personal MRs 
for each patient that are accessible to the patient is 
an illustrative example.2 The DMP has raised many 
difficulties regarding ethical and legal aspects, the 
definition of a common identifier and the creation 
of a central storage system for all records. As far 
as we are aware no country has managed to reach 
these goals at a national level. An alternative is to 
develop a strategy based on a pragmatic, secure, 
distributed, unstructured MR system which could 
be operational in the very short term. This article 
promotes a non-centralised and non-standardised 
MR system based on original search and access 
to distributed medical data like the one that exists 
in Israel (Clalit HMO and government hospitals), 
Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania—UPMC) [1] and is being 
implemented in Brussels (IRIS hospitals)3 and 
Franche Comte, France (EMOSYST).4
Grid technology, which has evolved quickly over 
the last 10 years, has enabled such an MR system. 
Today, it has reached a level of maturity in the field of 
distributed computing and data management, which 
makes it a natural choice to handle distributed medical 
data. It allows distributed data sources to be brought 
together, to be queried remotely and on demand, 
which mobilizes large CPU (Central Processing Unit) 
resources to analyse them.
In this paper, we discuss opportunities provided 
by grid technology to enable secure access to medical 
records through a google-like interface providing 
professionals and patients with permanent access 
to their medical information wherever it has been 
stored. The advantage of grid technology compared 
with other existing methods is that no movement of 
data is needed as they are queried where they are 
produced. We also discuss security issues beyond 
information access control (e.g. users’ authentication 
and assessments of users’ rights) and focus on the 
need to trace distributed data in order to know 
where they have come from, to know the last user 
to consult them and to make sure the data have not 
been damaged or tampered with. For this purpose, 
watermarking technologies provide a new way to 
protect data without interfering with the medical 
practice.
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The paper is organized as follows:
–  in section 2, we describe a proposal for a secure 
access to medical records through a “google-
like” interface.
–  in section 3, we present grid technology in more 
detail and provide examples of how it is being 
used currently to address specific medical needs 
in oncology.
–  in section 4, we discuss a number of issues to 
be addressed to enable the proposed access to 
medical records.
–  section 5 provides a conclusion and some 
perspectives.
2. proposal for a secure « Google 
Like » Access
Today, the main problem for health professionals 
or patients who want to have full access to medical 
information, particularly in oncology, is that this 
information is very often spread over many medical 
records kept by different health structures or 
professionals. Therefore, it would be convenient for 
the patient suffering from cancer, after identification 
and authentication, to be able to use a medical search 
engine to gain access to the medical information 
that has been selected by the medical practitioner 
(i.e. suitable for viewing by the patient) wherever it 
has been stored. The patient can also authorize other 
medical practitioners (for example if they meet for 
the first time) to consult his/her information.
First, generally speaking, in industrialised countries 
each health-care structure whatever the type (public 
or private) has an information system that gathers 
structured or unstructured computerised medical 
records. Secondly, information contained in the 
routine daily MR is sufficient for the needs of health 
professionals. Thus, the additional work a doctor needs 
to do to reconstitute a patient’s medical history (MH) 
is limited even if the patient frequently consults in 
different places, as is the case in cancerology. Doctors 
therefore have this extra workload only occasionally. 
Given the two previous points, and the dangers and 
complexity of a centralised system, it seems reasonable 
to us to set up a system that allows each doctor, once 
the consent of the patient has been obtained, to collect 
information on that patient from the different health 
structures. The doctor will then have to synthesise the 
patient’s MH for his personal use, save it in his personal 
information system site, and update it regularly. This 
effort to synthesise MRs will be reduced because one 
doctor can pass on information about his patients to 
other doctors in case the patient moves. For example, 
the General Practitioner could summarize the patient’s 
MH which could be accessed by his/her colleagues 
when necessary, and with the patient’s consent.
The main organisational advantage is that it 
could be operational rapidly because problems of 
harmonisation will be reduced and information will 
be more secure. The decentralised management 
principle supposes that the saved MR will remain in 
its unmodified form in terms of content and structure 
in hospitals and clinics, and will remain identifiable 
by certain elements that exist in all patients’ MRs 
such as first names, last names and dates of birth, and 
require no complementary indexation. When patients 
or doctors want to gain access to medical data that 
are distributed among the servers of various hospitals 
or clinics, they have to be connected to an electronic 
server on which they identify themselves. In the case 
of access by a doctor, at the first connection, the patient 
must be present so as to give his/her consent. This first 
connection will be made using the doctor’s professional 
card with a password. In the future, authentication 
could be ensured by using a professional identity 
or national identity card based on cryptographic 
methods. The system would transform the patient’s 
identity using a cryptographic algorithm. The aim of 
this algorithm is to obtain a strictly anonymous code, 
but always the same one for a given individual in 
order to link all the information concerning the same 
patient. It would not be possible for the management 
system to read directly in the memories of the local 
information system. All of the information would be 
gathered at the level of the decentralised management 
system which transfers it to the doctor. The interest 
of this approach is that it protects the confidentiality 
of the patient’s identity, particularly during transfer 
in the network. Only encrypted medical information 
would be moved. However, to go further about data 
security, questions must be answered on how to verify 
that information is reliable and on how to trace data 
after several copies have been made or when the data 
come from outside the system. Data reliability relies 
on proof of information integrity, of its origins and 
that it belongs to one patient. Though most standards 
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provide for such proof for one transmission, continuity 
of protection through several transactions is not 
guaranteed. Hackers who disrupt the confidentiality 
chain have to be identified and prosecuted.
3. Grid Technology for Distributed 
Medical Data Management
Providing patients with “google-like” secure access 
to their medical records requires the information to 
be available for querying and retrieval. Google is 
able to query and search for any data published on 
the Internet. However, it will be absolutely necessary 
to ensure the security of this Internet environment 
before storing any medical data on it. An alternative is 
provided by grid technology which allows distributed 
data to be queried securely according to personal 
access rights. Grids are defined as fully distributed, 
dynamically reconfigurable, scalable and autonomous 
infrastructures to provide location independent, 
pervasive, reliable, secure and efficient access to 
a coordinated set of services encapsulating and 
virtualising resource. Their relevance for managing 
medical information has been investigated within 
the framework of the HealthGrid initiative.5–8 Some 
platforms in medical data management,9 management 
of paediatric data10 or medical radiography data11 
already benefit from grid technologies to manage 
medical data securely thanks to dedicated grid 
middleware services such as MDM8 or Globus 
Medicus.9 The use of grids overcomes the difficulties 
inherent in a centralized storage system, especially 
high cost and complexity. Grids also make it possible 
to store data where or very close to where they are 
produced. Through grid authentication, authorization 
and accounting, only duly authorized persons can 
gain access to data which are encrypted and made 
anonymous when they are transmitted.12
Well-identified areas of relevance of the grid 
paradigm are epidemiology and computer-intensive 
analysis of geographically distributed medical 
images. Epidemiology focused on population-level 
research requires access to distributed, critically 
sensitive and heterogeneous data, resulting in overall 
costly computing processes. Users ought to be able 
to take it for granted that the security mechanisms 
are sufficient to protect their data; that the results of 
their research will be private and available to third 
parties only if designated; that the system will meet 
the concerns of the ethical and legal committees 
of their research institutions; that the services are 
reliable, efficient and permanent; that they do not 
have to change significantly their current procedures; 
protocols or workflow, and finally that the data is 
somehow automatically organised and gathered, and 
thus available for further exploitation. Early attempts 
at epidemiological applications of grids13 have 
demonstrated their relevance for patient customized 
research. In the next chapter, we will present an 
epidemiological application of grids for cancer 
surveillance which is currently being used in France.
Another attractive field of application for grid 
technology is computer-intensive analysis of distributed 
medical images. The impact of grid technology comes 
from the secure management of distributed images 
together with the capacity to gain access to large 
computing resources on demand to analyze them. 
In the field of oncology, the use of Computer-Aided 
Detection (CAD) for the analysis of mammograms 
was addressed by the MammoGrid project as early as 
2005.11 Other efforts focus on using grid computing 
resources to plan radiotherapy treatment:14 a case 
of the use of this technology currently exploited in 
collaboration with a French Cancer Treatment Centre 
will be further documented in chapter 4.
3.1. Case study 1: cancer surveillance 
network
Cancer screening programs aim at the early detection 
of the malignant tumors in order to improve the 
prognosis. Most EU countries have launched a national 
program for breast cancer screening.15 In France, when 
a woman is positively diagnosed with a risk of tumour, 
cancer associations are responsible for providing a 
second diagnosis on the mammograms and have to 
follow-up the pathology data about the tumour, which 
are stored by the laboratories. At present, the patient’s 
data are faxed on request or carried physically by the 
patient to the associations where they are recorded 
again. This process is costly and error prone as data 
has to be typed and reinterpreted twice.
The cytopathology data are also relevant for 
epidemiological analysis. The INVS (Sanitary 
Surveillance Institute), the French equivalent of 
the (E)CDC in the USA, is in charge of publishing 
indicators about global health and particularly about 
cancer. To produce its indicators, the INVS relies 
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on regional cancer registries (CRISAPs) set up to 
collect relevant information to support statistical 
and epidemiological studies about cancer incidence, 
mortality, prevalence or screening. CRISAPs (Centre 
de Regroupement Informatique et Statistique en 
Anatomie et cytologie Pathologiques) are like 
regional data warehouses collecting anonymous 
data from pathology laboratories or from healthcare 
establishments involved in cancer treatment. 
Healthcare professionals in laboratories are reluctant 
to release data because of cost and also because they 
lose some control over the data they have produced.
An alternative is for clients to query databases 
of the pathology laboratories. A grid, federating the 
laboratories, (see Fig. 1) would provide a secure 
framework enabling the screening associations to 
query databases and fill their local patient files.16 No 
action is required by physicians to put their data on 
the network. Thanks to the grid security architecture, 
the cytopathologists are able to define and modify the 
access rights of the users querying their data.
Several projects in Europe have studied or 
are currently exploring the advantages of grid 
technology with regard to breast cancer, particularly 
computer-aided diagnosis of mammograms (e-Diamond17 
and MammoGrid projects).11
If a sentinel network is able to federate pathology 
databases, it can be used by the epidemiological 
services of the National Institute for Health Surveillance 
(Institut National de Veille Sanitaire) and the regional 
epidemiological observatory.
In the present case, it means that women could 
consult their own data in the pathology laboratories 
as well as see mammographic images stored in the 
radiology services through the proposed network.
A cancer surveillance network is presently being 
implemented in the Auvergne region in France within 
the framework of the AuverGrid regional grid initiative 
(http://www.auvergrid.fr) using grid technology 
developed by the EGEE18 (AMGA metadata 
catalogue19 and MDM Medical Data Manager8 and 
Health-e-Child projects20 (Pandora Gateway).
3.2. Case study 2: application  
to radiotherapy
Radiotherapy is one of the three major treatments for 
cancer. It has demonstrated its efficacy in curing cancer 
and is also the most cost effective strategy. From a 
technology point of view, radiotherapy is a highly 
complex procedure, involving many computational 
operations for data gathering, processing and control. 
The treatment process requires large amounts of data 
from different sources that vary in nature (physics, 
mathematics, biostatistics, biology and medicine), 
which makes it an ideal candidate for healthgrid 
applications.
Nowadays, in radiotherapy and brachytherapy, 
commercial treatment planning systems (TPS), use an 
analytical calculation to determine dose distributions 
near the tumor and organs at risk. Such codes are 
very fast (execution time below one minute to give 
the dose distribution of a treatment), which makes 
them suitable for use in medical centres. For some 
specific treatments using very thin pencil beams 
(IMRT) and/or in the presence of heterogeneous 
tissues such as the air-tissue, lung-tissue and bone-
tissue interfaces, it appears that Monte Carlo 
simulations are the best way to compute complex 
cancer treatment by keeping errors in the dose 
calculation below 2%. The accuracy of Monte Carlo 
(MC) dose computation is excellent, provided that the 
computing power is sufficient to allow for extreme 
reduction of statistical noise. In order to finish MC 
computations within an acceptable time period for 
interactive use, parallel computing over very many 
CPUs has to be available. In this way, MC dose 
computations could become standard for radiotherapy 
quality assurance, planning and plan optimisation 
years before individual departments could afford 
local investment that is able to support MC.
With the objective of making Monte Carlo dose 
computations the standard method for radiotherapy 
quality assurance, planning and plan optimisation, we 
are participating in the development of a Monte Carlo 
platform dedicated to SPECT, TEP, radiotherapy and 
brachytherapy simulations together with 21 other 
research laboratories which are involved in the 
international collaboration OpenGATE (http://www.
opengatecollaboration. org).21 This GATE software 
with its accuracy and flexibility was made available 
to the public in 2004 and now has a community of 
over 1000 users worldwide. The limiting issue of 
GATE right now is its time consuming simulations 
for modelling realistic scans or treatment planning.
A secured web platform enabling medical 
physicists and physicians to use grid technology to 
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compute treatment planning using GATE Monte 
Carlo simulations and share medical data has been 
developed. This platform, named HOPE (Hospital 
Platform for E-health),22 provides quick, secure and 
easy to use tools to physicians or medical physicists to 
perform treatment planning on the Grid infrastructure. 
When the user is logged in, he/she has the possibility to 
upload or access medical data located on the hospital’s 
PACS (Picture Archiving and Communication 
System) server In the case of medical imaging for 
radiotherapy, the metadata server (AMGA)19 services 
located at the hospital collect metadata as attributes 
like the name of the patient, the characteristics of the 
disease, etc. SSL (Secure Socket Layer) connections 
in addition to encryption systems are used for the 
transfer of data. Authentication using ACLs (Access 
Control Lists) are used for the access to metadata in the 
database. The metadata server provides a replication 
layer which makes databases locally available to user 
jobs and replicates the changes between the different 
participating databases.
Information contained in electronic patient sheets 
is also registered as parameters in the metadata server. 
The anonymized medical images are registered on 
the grid. GridFTP (File Transfer Protocol) is used to 
enable advanced security transfers. Medical images 
are associated with patient sheets and the user can 
automatically visualize them.
By visualizing the tumour, the physician can 
choose what kind of device is the most appropriate 
to treat the patient using ionizing particles (field size, 
type of particle, energy, brachytherapy sources, ...). 
The treatment plans can be directly visualized from 
the HOPE portal and downloaded onto the personal 
computer of the user.
The web portal offers to the user a transparent 
and secure way to create, submit and manage 
GATE simulations using realistic scans in a grid 
environment. The conviviality of the web portal and 
the Grid performances could make it possible, in the 
near future, to use Monte Carlo simulations from 
clinical centres or hospitals to treat patients in routine 
clinical practice for specific radiotherapy treatments. 
In addition, the web platform functionalities enable 
direct access to medical data (patient sheets, images...) 
and secure sharing between two users located in 
different hospitals.
4. conditions of Implementation
In the previous section, we have shown how grid 
technology could provide the services needed to handle 
and analyze distributed medical data and images 
Figure 2. examples of GATe Monte Carlo simulations for radiotherapy treatment.
Ocular brachytherapy
treatment Radiotherapy
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securely. In this section, we discuss additional issues 
that need to be addressed in order to implement the 
proposed “Google Like” access to medical records.
4.1. The implication of assembling 
medical records in a grid environment: 
towards an ephemeral electronic Health 
record (e-eHr)
Storing all heath information in one place was the 
dream of centralisation proponents, who were certain 
that it was the only way to deal with the complexity. 
However, for many years, the public authorities have 
understood the danger of a centralised system, notably 
the considerable risk of losing all of the data if the 
centralised organisation is destroyed. After realising 
the weaknesses of a centralised system, the USA 
ministry of defence created in 1969 the ARPANET, 
a network system that would continue to function in 
the case of a catastrophe. Considering health data, 
hackers may see a centralised system as a challenge 
and try to gain access to the central patient MR system 
and modify patients’ medical information. Moreover 
a centralised information system may discourage 
doctors from providing health information; they may 
feel less responsible for the information than they do 
when they hold the information themselves. It may 
also be difficult for a centralised system to manage 
and store the huge quantity of information generated. 
Moreover, any breakdown, however short it may be, 
would have considerable repercussions given the 
number of people managed. It would be then safer 
to store information in different places to ensure 
protection and privacy.
As a consequence, our proposal for a secure 
system that allows the patient to gather the different 
parts of his medical record which may be spread 
in different healthcare systems may provide an 
interesting « alternative » to the classical proposal 
of a centralized medical record. With such a system, 
during the consultation, the oncologist will have 
the complete history of the patient thanks to the 
documents that the medical practitioner has declared 
as communicable and validated.
It is important to underline the fact that in such 
a system the medical information of the patients 
Figure 3. Hope (Hospital platform for e-health) web platform.
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stays in the different hospital or practitioner 
information systems under the responsibility of 
the hospital or of the practitioner. This provides 
better guarantees against attacks than does a 
centralized system. Moreover, information will 
be provided to other medical practitioners directly 
by the patients by transferring the right of access 
to the practitioner.
4.2. Authentication of patients and health 
professionals before access to medical 
records on line
Direct access to medical files via electronic media 
gives rise to many difficulties, and very strict access 
control and authentication measures are therefore 
essential, particularly in oncology. The principal 
difficulty in this field is to ensure that only the holder 
of the access rights will be able to gain access to the 
Personal Data.
A brief consideration of the risks associated 
with unlawful access to Medical Record systems 
for patients and for healthcare organizations makes 
it clear that a very reliable authentication system 
will be required before allowing any public access 
to such systems. The traditional approach for the 
authentication of individuals has two components: 
assertion of identity, followed by proof of the identity.1 
Generally, this proof can be in terms of something that 
the individual knows or something that the individual 
has or something that the individual is. Technical 
solutions are available to cover any degree of proof in 
authenticating individuals, but many of them would 
require a substantial organization system to be set up 
before they could become effective.
Biometric technologies are sometimes proposed as 
a way to associate a patient with his or her medical 
data, as they do not require the patient to bring any 
documents or remember any information. Though 
this technology represents real progress both in the 
identification and in the authentication of the patient, 
there are still many questions4 regarding the accuracy 
and reliability of each biometric technology and 
the associated costs. But the main problem lies in 
the acceptability of such systems by organizations 
concerned with ethical considerations such as 
patients’ associations, national ethics committees, 
human rights associations, and national committees 
for data protection. For example, in France, the use 
of biometric solutions for identification in the field of 
health has not been approved by the National Ethics 
Committee.
Even today, after extensive computerization of 
Medical Record systems, the simplest and most 
common authentication mechanism is still that of 
an “Identifier” together with a “Password”. This 
approach combines simplicity of use and management, 
but it is the weakest and the most unsatisfactory 
mechanism.23 The most satisfactory approach would 
lie in the creation of an individual chip card including 
electronic signature cryptographic algorithms,24 both 
for patients and health professionals. Generated 
signatures will have the value of legal proof in front 
of a court, as they are legally recognised, and would 
provide access follow up. It must be noticed that 
the availability of such a chip card will take some 
time and will generate considerable expenditure 
before becoming the accepted standard. As this more 
satisfactory electronic solution cannot be implemented 
now and everywhere, only inferior less safe solutions 
can be considered.
A possible solution is a smart card,25–27 associated 
with the provision of a secret PIN code with 
8 characters, like the one proposed for use in France 
for the DMP project. This solution would require 
hospitals to be equipped with powerful firewall-
type data-processing devices to filter access. 
In such a system, patients provide a list of medical 
practitioners who are authorized to have permanent 
access to their medical data. The access rights given 
to the medical practitioners can be erased at any 
time by the patient (for example, if he/she moves 
to another town), who can also authorize temporary 
access for other medical practitioners he/she has to 
consult.
In emergency cases, when the patient is unable to 
express his/her will, the easiest solution is to provide 
access through a specific procedure (breaking 
the glass procedure), under the responsibility of 
the medical practitioner in charge of the patient, 
with immediate notification to an official security 
supervisor. This partial solution represents a 
compromise between security rules and the patient’s 
health care and ensures that collected data are made 
available when necessary. It is a general principle 
of penal law to consider that citizens generally act 
in accordance with social rules and that penalties 
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are imposed as a deterrent and to punish those who 
break the law.
Medical records transmitted to patients must be 
electronically signed by the practitioner to be sure 
that he/she has agreed to this transfer and that no 
unauthorized modifications have been made, which 
is essential in oncology, particularly for pathological 
descriptions of the disease. Here also, the recognition 
of the legal value of the electronic signature permits 
controlled electronic transmission of the medical 
record to the patient. This electronic signature also 
makes it possible to ensure that any modifications of 
the medical record, for example, adding new medical 
information, are made by the medical practitioner. 
However, such signatures are ancillary data that can 
be easily removed.
4.3. Verifiying data reliability  
and tracing outsourced data
As stated previously in section 1, questions arise 
about how to trace information and verify its 
reliability. For example, once data are decrypted, 
they are not protected any more; they can be copied 
exactly, routed away from the initial use, tampered 
with, and so on.
Recently, watermarking has been proposed for 
the protection of medical information.28 Basically, 
watermarking is defined as the invisible embedding or 
insertion of a message in a host document, for example 
an image, like XML structured data. Watermarking 
provides an original way to share a document with 
some ancillary data like protection data or meta-data, 
in a way that is a priori independent of the information 
file storage format. For example, with regard to 
images, security elements are introduced in the signal 
by imperceptible modification. Watermarked data 
thus remain attached at the signal level independently 
of the image file format. It means that embedded 
data can be recovered after file format conversion; 
for example, conversion which occurs when data are 
outsourced from the system or when they have been 
screen captured.
Most of the work on watermarking for medical 
images has been related to the need to verify image 
integrity (embedding a digital signature inf the 
image) or improve confidentiality,28 as it is often 
considered that embedding information makes it 
more difficult for unauthorized persons to gain access 
to this information. Watermarking is complementary 
to other security mechanisms. It gives access to a 
kind of communication channel that is transparent to 
non-compliant systems, as it does not add extra-header 
information, while compliant systems will be able to 
read embedded data.
In the considered framework, before an isolated 
medical document can be accessed or shared it has 
to be identified. A watermarked authentication code 
may allow identification of the health professional 
who consulted the patient data for the purpose of 
traceability, or the identification of the patient. 
To go further, if the embedded identity is rendered 
anonymous,29 then it is possible to gain access to 
and to link information concerning the same patient 
without knowing his or her identity so as to guarantee 
both privacy and interoperability. These patient 
privacy issues may appear during the verification 
process, which is necessary to reduce the risk of errors 
when identifying documents in everyday practice or 
when sending a patient’s Electronic Health Record. 
For example, the verifier may be able to gain access 
to patient data without authorization. This method 
may also provide a solution to the problem of the 
identification of lost medical documents. However, 
further research and development are necessary to 
extend watermarking methodology to text.
4.4. Integration profiles and standards
In the last few years, access to medical data in a 
distributed or centralized model has been the object 
of several studies which led to the specification of 
integration profiles.30 Several EHRs projects based 
on these integration profiles are currently in progress. 
The main profiles that support the EHRs system are 
the following:
• The integration profile XDS (cross referencing 
document sharing) which defines a communication 
infrastructure based on metadata and using 
structured (based on standards such as HL7 
CDAv2 for documents and DICOM for images) or 
unstructured data (pdf documents);
• PIX (patient identity cross referencing) and 
PDQ (patient demographic query) profiles for 
management of the identity of the patient, which 
defines how to link the identity of the patient when 
registered in different organizations or domains);
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• BPPC profile for patient consent, which defines 
the rights attached to a document
• And other security profiles such as ATNA profiles 
for security of nodes and audit trails.
4.5. Technology against ethics  
and law: the limits of liability
Even though watermarking methodology allows 
us to solve the most important part of the problem 
concerning secure access of the patient to his 
or her medical record by embedding a strong 
identification marker in the document, two main 
dangers still exist. The first lies in the fact that this 
process of “automatic” access is not accompanied 
by any medical explanation and even more 
importantly, there will be no medical warning 
about the contents that the patient will read. It is 
by no means certain that providing patients with 
routine direct access to their medical records 
automatically extracted from the database is a 
very satisfactory solution from a medical point of 
view. If the medical records contain information 
(like the diagnosis of the cancer) which may cause 
serious psychological distress (possibly leading to 
suicide), the hospital or the medical practitioner 
could be held responsible from a legal point of 
view or at least from an ethical or deontological 
point of view. In oncology, the contents of the 
medical record need to be carefully reviewed 
(updated or validated) before being delivered to 
patients. In other cases, information contained 
in a medical record may refer to third persons 
(in cases of hereditary diseases, or in cases of 
divorce), and providing access to such information 
may be considered a breach of confidentiality. 
Once again, the hospital or the practitioner may be 
held legally responsible. Therefore, even though 
providing patients with automatic access to their 
medical records appears to be satisfactory from a 
technical and data-security point of view, it may 
not fulfil the quality requirements for the security 
of healthcare information. No transmission should 
be allowed without the consent of the medical 
practitioner who takes care of the patient, or the 
practitioner’s representative. As the practitioner is 
legally responsible, his/her formal agreement to 
the transmission is required, and the transmitted 
document should be electronically signed by 
him/her.
The second point lies in the use of the medical 
record by the patient. As patients are deemed to be 
responsible adults, we will not consider the possible 
unexpected effects of communicating their medical 
records to their insurance company or bank, which 
may have required it officially or unofficially. From 
a medical point of view, the main problem could 
come from modifications of the medical record by 
patients themselves to erase information that prevents 
them from obtaining certain advantages. If such 
modifications were possible, imagine what could 
happen if patients erased the fact that they had cancer 
in order to get a job. Thus, it does not seem desirable 
to give to everybody direct access to the system 
that manages the files, even to authenticated users. 
However, it seems reasonable to verify integrity and 
authenticity of outsourced data, especially when they 
are used in a healthcare framework. The original 
medical record, which is the means to bring evidence 
in case of litigation, should be protected from any 
kind of attempt by unauthorised persons to modify 
the information. It will then be preferable to envisage 
a request procedure for access, including the search 
for the file and the extraction of the communicable 
documents authorized by the law. This approach, 
in which a special access file is created, could happen 
much faster than the time delay allowed in some 
European countries (in the UK the authorities have 
40 days to comply with a Subject’s Access request, 
whereas in France, the delay is 8 days).
5. conclusion
The idea that every citizen will have direct access to 
his medical records anywhere is no longer a utopia, as 
this situation can be considered the logical outcome 
of much of the work that is going on world-wide in 
e-Government, e-Health and e-Shopping. With the 
constant progress of technology, it is now possible to 
envisage the possibility of “reassembling” personal 
health records anywhere and anytime. But security 
measures need to be much stronger, necessitating 
mechanisms to provide continuous data protection.
In this paper we have illustrated the potential of grid 
technology for medical data record sharing through 
its use in two experimental cases. The deployment 
of such technology needs to be coupled with 
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relevant security measures and mechanisms. Strict 
identity checks for both the patient and healthcare 
professionals are necessary and can be based on 
cryptographic techniques as those planned for the 
electronic signature. They can also be used to ensure 
the confidentiality and integrity of files, authentication 
of the applicant’s identity and access follow-up. 
In addition, watermarking technology can provide 
ultimate protection once access control is bypassed. 
This would ensure the reliability and traceability of 
data inside and outside the system. With regard to 
search engines, who could have imagined ten years 
ago that a system would be able to retrieve everything 
you have ever published and list all the people who 
have made a reference to it in a matter of seconds!
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